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Abstract. The present paper analyses the behaviour of a university within a neoclassical equi-
librium framework. Demand for enrolments is traced back to the decision of potential students 
which aim at maximizing expected lifetime income. Here, the key factors are the students’ pref-
erences and abilities, the quality of education offered by the university and several external de-
terminants like, e.g., tuition fees and differences in income between graduates and non-graduates. 
In turn, the behaviour of the university in terms of educational efforts and the strength of aca-
demic standards depends on the demand for enrolments, on financial resources available and on 
the specific objectives pursued by the university. The main emphasis is on the implications of 
different funding mechanism (governmental grants vs. tuition fees) in combination with differ-
ent objectives pursued (maximizing enrolments vs. maximizing prestige via research output). It 
is shown that for given financial resources a university that aims at maximizing prestige always 
provides only a lower quality of education for a smaller number of students compared to a uni-
versity that aims at maximizing enrolments. Moreover, the effects caused by changes in gov-
ernmental grants or tuition fees are quite different depending on the university’s objectives. Yet, 
there is also one common feature: Irrespective of which utility function is maximized, partially 
substituting governmental grants by tuition fees would change neither educational efforts nor 
academic standards, but it would inevitably lead to decreasing enrolments. As a positive side-
effect, however, the average ability of the remaining population of students would increase. 
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1. Introduction1 
Although economists have traditionally paid only minor attention to non-profit organi-
zations, a lot of research has been done on the economics of universities since Ve-
blen’s pioneering work „The Higher Learning in America“ (1918). Most of this re-
search, however, is dominated by human capital theory and concentrates on the deter-
mination of returns on investments in higher education. Compared to this, only little 
work has been done on the institutional behaviour of universities and its determinants 
within the market context.2 Moreover, even in this subgroup of literature, most of the 
work is rather descriptive and lacks of formal strength. There are surprisingly little 
attempts to rigorously analyse the behaviour of universities within a neoclassical equi-
librium framework that explicitly accounts for utility maximization by the individuals 
involved. According to a recent survey by Raines/Leathers (2003, pp. 186) the most 
comprehensive and sophisticated approach available in the literature is still the model 
presented by Garvin (1980, pp. 21). However, even this model yields only limited in-
sights into the issue at hand since it concentrates on the supply side and pays no atten-
tion to the question, how the demand function for enrolments is determined. Moreover, 
Garvin refrains from any comparative statics and arrives only at some fairly general 
optimality conditions which just reiterate the well known requirement to equate mar-
ginal costs and benefits of all decisions taken by the university. Consequently, the 
model does not provide any clue to important policy issues like, e.g., the reaction of 
the university and the accompanying change in enrolments if government decides to 
partially substitute governmental grants paid to the university by increasing tuition 
fees.  
The present paper tries to shed some light on issues like this using an equilibrium model 
that accounts for the maximization behaviour of all individuals involved. In short, de-
mand for enrolments is traced back to the decision of (potential) students which aim at 
maximizing expected lifetime income. The key factors of this decision process are the 
students’ preferences and abilities, the quality of education offered by the university 
and several external determinants. In turn, the behaviour of the university in terms of 
educational efforts and the strength of academic standards depends on the demand for 
enrolments, on the amount of financial resources available and on the specific objec-
                                                          
1  The author gratefully acknowledges helpful comments by Albrecht Bossert and Jürgen Dietz (Uni-
versity of Augsburg, Department of Economics). Of course, the usual disclaimer applies.  
2  See, e.g., the extensive collection of surveys on the economics of universities edited by Hoenack 
and Collins (1990). For more recent contributions see Johnes (2000) and Raines/Leathers (2003).  
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tives pursued by the university. A detailed description of the model is given in Section 2. 
In Section 3, the equilibrium conditions are derived and Section 4 provides a through-
out comparative statics analysis. Finally, Section 5 closes the paper with a short sum-
mary of the main findings and some remarks on promising routes for future research.  
Before proceeding, however, on important qualification should be noted. The model 
presented below follows the tradition of Garvin (1980) and attempts an entirely posi-
tive economic analysis. Hence, it does not ask, how a university should behave from 
the viewpoint of social welfare, but it asks how universities actually behave. Within 
this context, the main emphasis is on the implications of different funding mechanisms 
(governmental grants vs. tuition fees) in combination with different objectives pursued 
by the university (maximizing enrolments vs. maximizing prestige via research output).  
2. The model      
2.1 Demand side 
In order to keep the model as simple as possible and to avoid complications associated 
with competition between different universities, it is assumed that there exists only one 
university in the geographical area under consideration and potential students (i.e., in-
dividuals who just have accomplished university entrance qualification) are completely 
immobile.3 Potential students only have to decide whether to enrol at university or to 
start working within the non-academic sector. This decision, however, is subject to 
uncertainty since students once enrolled cannot be sure whether or not they finally will 
become graduated. In general, it seems sensible to assume that the probability to be-
come graduated depends on an individual’s innate ability in terms of coping with the 
requirements of academic education as well as on the characteristics of education sup-
plied by the university. To capture this decision problem, indicate potential students by 
j=1,2,…,n, and let us assume that the innate ability of individual j is given by αj∈ ]1,0[
]1,
. 
Moreover, denote the strength of the university’s academic standards by q∈  and 
its educational efforts, measured as the ratio between financial resources devoted to 
instruction and the number of students enrolled, by e . Now, let us combine these 
factors in order to build a “success function” which describes the probability that indi-
vidual j will become graduated if she chooses to enrol at university:   
0[
0>
                                                          
3  Neglecting competition is almost standard in economic models of the behaviour of universities as 
complained by Rothschild/White (1993, p.11). Nevertheless, as pointed out by Garvin (1980, p.9), 
the assumption of immobility of potential students and its implications concerning limited competi-
tion between universities seems to be more or less realistic except for universities with a very high 
reputation for excellence which attract students from a larger geographic market. 
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[1] .    )q,e(ww jj ⋅α=
Hence, individual j’s probability to become graduated if she chooses to study is c.p. 
the higher, the higher her own ability αj is. Moreover, the function w(e,q) is assumed 
to be continuous, twice differentiable and to satisfy the following properties for any 
level of e>0 and q :  ]1,0[∈




, 0w e >′ , 0wee <′′ , 0w q <′ ,  and . 0wqq <′′ 0wqe ≥′′
Since w(e,q) is the most important driving force within the present model, the above 
assumptions should carefully be recognized. Due to 0w e >′  and 0w q <′  the probability 
to become graduated is c.p. the higher, the higher are the university’s educational ef-
forts and the lower are its academic standards. The second derivative  indicates 
decreasing marginal “productivity” of educational efforts. The second derivative 
 indicates an increasing marginal reduction in the probability to become gradu-
ated if academic standards are tightened. Moreover, if educational efforts approaches 
zero the probability to become graduated also tends to zero irrespective of academic 
standards. Similarly, for any level of educational efforts the probability to become 




4 Finally, the assumed sign of the cross derivative qew ′′  indicates that the reduc-
tion in the probability to become graduated caused by a marginal strengthening of aca-
demic standards is decreasing or at least constant if educational efforts are increased.  
Next, let us assume that the discounted lifetime income of an individual who decides 
not to study at all is given by R . Graduates of the university under consideration re-
ceive a discounted lifetime income of pR)1)(zq1( −γ−+  with z>0, 0<γ<1 and p>0. 
The term (1+zq) reflects that higher academic standards c.p. lead to a higher future 
income of the university’s graduates,5 p represents a tuition fee charged by the univer-
sity and the term )1( γ−  corrects for the opportunity cost of education in terms of for-
gone income during studying.6 In contrast to graduates, drop-outs suffer from time and 
                                                          
4  Taken together, these two assumptions assure that the model always leads to an interior solution 
with e>0 and q<1.  
5  Note that the model does not distinguish whether the differences in income between graduates and 
non-graduates are due to the accumulation of human capital or just due to a pure signalling effect 
(on this topic see, e.g., Belfield, 2000, Chap. 2). Assuming for example that the income of a gradu-
ate of a university with “average” academic standards q=0.5 is twice as high as the income of a non-
graduate would imply z=2. On empirical data on the correlation between academic standards of 
universities and the average starting salary of graduates are provided by Rothschild/White (1993).  
6  Assuming for example that the time spent by a student at university accounts for ten percent of her 
total working life would imply γ=0.1. 
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money vainly spent at university, return to working within the non-academic sector 
and end up with a discounted lifetime income of only pR)1( −γ− . Hence, the present 
value of expected lifetime income of individual j if she chooses to enrol at university is 
given by =)R(E j p]R)1)[(w1(]R)1)(zq1[(w jj −γ−−+γ−+ . Inserting the success func-
tion [1] as introduced above and cancelling terms, this can be re-calculated as: 
pR)]q,e(wzq1)[ j −α+γ−1()R j =
R>β+
[2] (E .  
At this stage of reasoning, there is a strong temptation to assert that individual j will 
choose to enrol at university only if this leads to an expected lifetime income higher 
than the lifetime income of a worker within the non-academic sector, i.e., R)R(E j > . 
However, money is not everything and studying for some years probably might be 
more fun than immediately starting to work. In order to account for these additional 
“leisure benefits” of studying, the model assumes that individual j will choose to study 
if )R( jE  with β>0.7 As a consequence, individual j will refrain from studying if 
her ability αj falls short of a certain minimum level α  which can be calculated from 






=α .  
According to [3], the minimum ability α  is c.p. the higher, the higher are the opportu-
nity cost of studying given by Rγ  and the higher are the direct costs given by the tui-
tion fee p. The latter result reiterates the well known observation that tuition fees are 
not only a source of funding but also an economic mechanism of selection which can 
be used to keep less talented individuals from studying (see, e.g., Rothschild/White 
1993).   
Now let us assume that the different individuals’ abilities {α1,α2,…,αn} are uniformly 
distributed on the [0,1]-space. Under this condition, the total number of students at-












The implications of this demand function for higher education should carefully be 
noted. As indicated by [4], the number of students attracted is c.p. the higher, the 
                                                          
7  Of course, in order to ensure an interior solution, it has to be assumed that leisure benefits in terms 
of monetary equivalents are smaller than the costs of studying at all, i.e. pR +γ<β . Otherwise, 
studying would be attractive even for the least talented individual with αj=0.  
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smaller is the tuition fee p,8 the smaller are opportunity costs of forgone income Rγ , 
the higher are leisure benefits β, the higher are the differences in income between 
graduates and non-graduates indicated by z, and the higher are the university’s educa-
tional efforts e. In contrast, the impact of academic standards on the number of stu-









=′ .     
The reason for this ambiguity is straight forward: On the one hand, for given ability αj 
and given educational efforts e, an increase in q reduces the student’s probability to 
become graduated as easily can be seen from 0wq <′ . On the other hand, however, an 
increase in q also leads to a higher future income of those students who finally become 
graduated. Taken together, these two opposite effects imply that for given educational 
efforts, increased enrolments must not necessarily come at the expense of reduced 
academic standards. Instead, starting with a sufficiently small q, the effect on the fu-
ture income of graduates might dominate such that a further increase in q might lead to 
a higher number of students attracted.  
Before proceeding to the supply side by describing the university’s objectives and con-
straints it should be recognized that the above model also allows to draw a conclusion 
about the “quality” of the students attracted in the sense of their average ability. Since 
only those individuals with ]1,[j α∈α  will decide to study, their average ability 













1)q,e(~ .  
Comparing [4] and [6] also reveals that an increasing number of students attracted al-
ways comes at the expense of a lower average ability. 
2.2 Supply Side 
Now, let us turn to the university’s decision problem. Irrespective of the specific ob-
jectives pursued, the university inevitably has to satisfy the budget constraint B≥C 
where B indicates total financial resources available and C indicates total costs. Within 
the present model, the university is financed partially by governmental grants and par-
tially by tuition fees, both fixed by the government. Denoting governmental grants per 
                                                          
8 For a survey of empirical studies on the impact of tuition fees on enrolments see, e.g, Heller (1997).  
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student by g>09 and the tuition by p>0, total financial resources available to the uni-
versity are given by B=(g+p)·s(e,q). Total costs can be divided in two major catego-
ries:10 Education costs and costs due to research activities. Accounting for education 
costs per student given by the level of educational efforts, e, and denoting costs due to 
research activities by r, leads to total costs of C=e·s(e,q)+r.11 As a consequence, the 
budget constraint of the university is given by: 
[7] . r)q,e(se)q,e(s)pg( +⋅≥⋅+
It should be noted that this budget constraint implies cross-subsidization between tui-
tion and research which is standard in the literature on the economics of university 
behaviour (see, e.g., James 1990): The university carries out a profitable activity that 
might yield only little utility per se (i.e., teaching students) in order to finance an other 
activity that increases utility but does not cover its own costs (i.e., research activities). 
Of course, the degree of direct utility derived from teaching students depends on the 
objectives pursued by the university. Determining the objectives of a university is 
made difficult by its internal organization: A university is no single actor but consists 
of different subgroups without a simple hierarchy − in particular administration and 
faculty − which might pursue different and perhaps conflicting goals (see, e.g. James 
1990; Tuckman/Chung, 1990).12 However, concerning the objectives pursued by a uni-
versity at the aggregate level, there seems to be a widespread consensus among 
economists that two − partially interrelated − factors are of major importance: The 
quantity of students attracted and the degree of prestige obtained within the scientific 
community (see, e.g., Raines/Leathers 2003, James 1990, Garvin 1980).  
The quantity of students attracted is important from the viewpoint of faculty and ad-
ministration because expanded enrolments are likely to be accompanied by an increas-
ing number of faculty positions and a higher budget to secure expanded facilities like, 
                                                          
9  It could be objected that governmental grants spent to universities are usually a fixed of amount of 
money independent from the number of students actually attracted. This view might be suitable in 
the short-run. In the long-run, however, it seems more sensible to assume that an increasing number 
of students attracted is accompanied by increasing governmental grants. 
10  For an exhaustive discussion of the different costs involved by operating a university see, e.g., 
Getz/Siegfried (1991) and Brinkman (1990). 
11  It should be noted that this cost function implies constant returns to scale in education. This simpli-
fication seems to be justified since empirical evidence indicates only modest economies of scale. 
For an overview on several cost studies see Brinkman (1990) and Hoenack (1990). 
12  In some countries like, e.g., Germany, administration tasks are executed by faculty members them-
selves on the base of a rotation system. This organization often leads to a somewhat amateurish 
management but it might help to overcome the problem of conflicting goals as mentioned above.  
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e.g, laboratories and libraries.13 Moreover, expanded enrolments endow the university 
with a larger pool of students for the selection of research assistants and it generally 
enhances the university’s survival as an organization.  
Prestige is the second major component entering the university’s utility function since 
it increases the faculty members’ market values, generally improves their self-respect 
and makes research grants easier to obtain (e.g., Garvin 1980, p. 23). Prestige mainly 
can be traced back to the quality and quantity of research output “produced” by the 
university.14 With respect to this, the model assumes that financial resources devoted 
to research activities can be used as a proxy for the quality and quantity of research 
output, as measured by, e.g., appropriate indexes of publication productivity.15 The 
amount of financial resources available for research can easily be evaluated from the 












To sum up, the university under consideration may derive utility from the number of 
students attracted, s(e,q), as well as from the amount of financial resources available 
for research, r(e,q). This approach is sufficiently general to describe the behaviour of a 
large spectrum of different universities that assign different weights to these objec-
tives. As emphasized by Garvin (1980, p.35), in practice some types of universities are 
primarily concerned with maximizing enrolments, whereas other types of universities 
primarily aim at maximizing prestige. In order to focus on the implications of these 
different kinds of behaviour, the following analysis assumes that the university under 
consideration solely aims at maximizing either enrolments or the research budget. Of 
course, this assumption is somewhat artificial since in reality most universities aim at 
maximizing a combination of these two elements. But looking at the extremes will 
facilitate a clear-cut analysis of the different objectives’ implications.  
                                                          
13  With respect to this line of argumentation, the economics of universities is very similar to the eco-
nomics of bureaucracies (see, e.g., Downs 1967, Niskanen 1971). However, as pointed out by Gar-
vin (1980, p.38), just applying the bureaucratic standard approach of budget maximization to the 
behaviour of a university would imply an oversimplification. 
14  Other factors which add to prestige are particularly the quantity and quality of Ph.D. programs (see, 
e.g., Raines/Leather 2003, p.194). This issue, however, is beyond the scope of the present model.  
15  It should be emphasized that this assumption, which is standard in modelling the behaviour of uni-
versities, neglects the possibility of economies of scale in research activities as well as the possibil-
ity of economies of scope resulting from the joint production of tuition and research. On this issues 
see, e.g., Brinkman (1990, p.123) and Johnes (2000, p.142).  
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3. Equilibrium  
First, consider a university that solely aims at maximizing enrolments. Under this as-
sumption, due to 0we >′  the whole budget available will be allocated to educational 
efforts, i.e., e . Hence, the only remaining variable to be decided about are 
academic standards q. Maximizing  and accounting for  leads to the 
following first order condition (for the second order condition see Appendix I): 
pg +*=
)q,e(s pg*e +=
[9] . 0sq =′
As can be calculated from [4], s 0q =′  implies 0wq)q,e(w q =′+ . The interpretation of 
this condition is straight forward. Marginally increasing q induces two opposite ef-
fects: it reduces the students’ probability to become graduated and it increases the fu-
ture income of those who finally become graduated. Condition [9] requires to choose 
q* in such a way that these two effects are balanced in order to maximize the number 
of students attracted. However, one important caveat should be noted. Since s(e,q)>0 
requires R/()pR()q,e(w β−+γ> zq)1 γ− , as can be seen from [4], educational efforts 
and thereby financial resources available per student, g+p, have to exceed a certain 
lower bound (g+p)min in order to ensure an interior solution where the university is 
able to attract a positive number of students at all. This lower bound is c.p. the higher, 
the higher are opportunity costs of studying minus leisure benefits and the smaller are 
the differences in income between graduates and non-graduates. 
Now, consider a university that solely aims at maximizing prestige via maximizing 
research output. From differentiating )q,e(s)epg()q,e(r −+=  with respect to e and q 
we obtain the following first order conditions (for the second order conditions see Ap-
pendix I):  
[10] ,   0sq =′
[11] . 0)q,e(ss)epg( e =−′−+
Condition [10] again requires to fix academic standards in such a way that enrolments 
s(e,q) are maximized for any given level of educational efforts. Condition [11] reflects 
that a marginal increase in the money spent on educational efforts per student, de>0, 
has two opposite effects on the research budget: On the one hand, r(e,q) decreases by 
s(e,q)de since more money is needed to instruct those students already enrolled. On the 
other hand, the number of students enrolled will increase by s dee′  which leads to an 
increase in r(e,q) by (  because any new student attracted adds an amount 




academic standards, [11] requires to fix educational efforts in such a way as to balance 
these two effects. Finally, taken together [10] and [11] imply that e and q have to be 
combined in such a way that the effects of marginally varying both variables on the 
research budget are equalized.  
The above results reiterate that a university can benefit from enlarged enrolments not 
only directly but also indirectly via an increase in resources available for research. 
With respect to this, the behaviour of a university that aims at maximizing prestige via 
research activities is very similar to the behaviour of a university that aims at maximiz-
ing enrolments. However, in the latter case we obtain e*=g+p, whereas in the former 
case a part of the budget available is allocated to research activities, such that e*<g+p. 
Moreover, maximizing r(e,q) implies a lower level of academic standards q* and a 
smaller number of students attracted s* compared to maximizing s(e,q).16 However, as 
already emphasized above, in order to attract a positive number of students at all, a 
certain minimum level of educational efforts is needed. Consequently, the university 
will be able to squeeze out extra money for financing research activities only if total 
financial resources available per student exceed a lower bound (g+p)min .  
From the viewpoint of government, the message of the above results is obvious: For 
given governmental grants and tuition fees, a university that solely aims at maximizing 
prestige via research activities provides only a lower quality of education17 for a 
smaller number of students compared to a university that solely aims at maximizing 
enrolments. The overall welfare effects of these different outcomes, however, depend 
on the weights assigned to education and research in the social welfare function which 
is beyond the scope of the present analysis.  
4. Comparative Statics Analysis 
Now, consider a marginal increase in governmental grants g, the effects of which are 
summarized in the second column of Table 1.18  If the university under consideration 
solely aims at maximizing enrolments, we obtain de*/dg=1, dq*/dg>0 and ds*/dg>0. 
                                                          
16 To see this, note that in both cases the first order condition s 0q =′  has to be satisfied. Hence, due to 
 (see [A.1] in Appendix I) and 0sqq <′ 0sqe >′  (see [A.6] in Appendix II), a lower value of e* has 
always to be accompanied by a lower value of q and vice versa. Moreover, in both cases s(e,q) is 
maximized for given educational efforts per student. A lower value of e*, however, implies that 
s(e,q) attains its maximum at a lower absolute level.  
17  Here, “educational quality” refers to the chosen mix of educational efforts e and academic standards 
q. Formally, educational quality can be viewed as a function f(e,q) with 0fe >′  and f .  0q >′
18 Concerning the derivation of the comparative statics results discussed in this Section see Appendix II.  
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Hence, in this case, increasing governmental grants leads to a higher educational qual-
ity and an increasing number of students attracted which, however, comes at the costs 
of a decreasing average ability. In contrast, if the university under consideration solely 
aims at maximizing prestige via research output, neither educational quality nor en-
rolments will change and the complete amount of extra money obtained from govern-
ment will be absorbed by the research budget. Hence, in this case, there is no possibil-
ity to influence the university’s behaviour via marginally varying governmental grants.  
 
 dg>0 dp>0 −dg=dp>0 dz>0, dβ>0 dγ>0, Rd >0 
      
de* 1 1 0 0 0 
dq* + + 0 0 0 
ds* + ? − + − 
      
de* 0 0 0 0 0 
dq* 0 0 0 0 0 
ds* 0 − − + − 
dr* + ? − + − 
Maximizing enrolments s(e,q) 
Maximizing the research budget r(e,q) 
Table 1: Results of Comparative Statics Analysis. 
Next, consider a marginal increase in the tuition fee p, the effects of which are summa-
rized in the third column of Table 1. Let us begin again with a university that solely 
aims at maximizing enrolments. In this case we again obtain de*/dp=1 and dq*/dp>0. 
Consequently, marginally increasing the tuition fee has the same impact on educational 
efforts and academic standards as marginally increasing governmental grants. How-
ever, one important difference remains. Whereas the latter measure increases educa-
tional quality without increasing the students’ costs, this is not true for the former one. 
Hence, whereas marginally increasing governmental grants always leads to an increas-
ing number of students, the respective effect caused by marginally increasing the tui-









The reason for this ambiguity is straightforward: According to [2], increasing the tuition 
fee by dp>0 has two opposite effects on the students’ expected lifetime income. On the 
one hand, it directly decreases E  by dp. On the other hand, due to de*=dp it in-
creases the probability to become graduated by 
)R( j
dpwe′  which leads to an increase in 
expected lifetime income by dpRwej ′αzq)1 γ−( . Hence, the total effect is given by 
dp]1Rwzq)1([)R(dE ejj −′αγ−= . Now, consider the student “at the margin” with abil-






Comparing [12] and [13] reveals that ds*/dp>0 requires dE  for the student 
at the margin. Due to e*=p+g and 
0dp/)R( j >
0wee <′′ , whether or not the condition  
is satisfied depends on the initial magnitude of e. Starting with a comparatively low e, 
educational efforts exhibit a high “marginal productivity” in the sense of increasing the 
probability to become graduated. Hence, in this case the indirect effect of increasing 
 by 
0dp/)R(dE j >
)R(dE j dpRwzq)1( ej ′αγ−  will dominate such that dE  and therefore 
ds*/dp>0. However, in a situation where educational efforts are already comparatively 
high, the direct effect of decreasing  will dominate such that  and 
therefore ds*/dp<0. Consequently, in the case of maximizing enrolments, marginally 
increasing the tuition fee p will lead to an increasing enrolments only if total financial 
resources available per student, g+p, initially are comparatively low.  
0dp/)R( j >
(dE)R(E j 0dp/)R j <
If the tuition fee p is marginally increased and the university under consideration 
solely aims at maximizing prestige via research output, we again obtain the result that 
neither educational efforts nor academic standards will change and the complete 
amount of extra money obtained from students will be absorbed by the research 
budget. However, in contrast to the case of increasing governmental grants, an in-
crease in the tuition fee will lead to decreasing enrolments. As a consequence, the 












Similar, to the above case, dr*/dp>0 requires that the direct effect of increasing the 
tuition fee dominates the indirect effect of decreasing enrolments. 19  
                                                          
19 Note, that from [12] and [14], respectively, we could easily derive conditions describing the optimal 
tuition fee from the viewpoint of the university. In this case, where the university is empowered to 
deliberately fix p, however, the second order conditions turn out to be highly complex.  
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From the viewpoint of government, the most interesting question might be, what hap-
pens if governmental grants are partially substituted by tuition fees, i.e. −dg=dp>0. As 
indicated by the results summarized in the forth column of Table 1, irrespective of the 
objectives pursued by the university, such a substitution would change neither educa-
tional efforts nor academic standards, but it would inevitably lead to decreasing en-
rolments and a decreasing research budget. Of course, as a positive side-effect, the 
average ability of the remaining population of students would increase. But neverthe-
less, the above results clearly indicate that partially substituting governmental grants 
by tuition fees can never be in the interest of the university.  
Finally, assume a marginal increase in the other exogenous parameters z, β, γ and R . 
As indicated by the results summarized in the last two columns of Table 1, irrespective 
of the objectives pursued by the university, there will be no change in educational ef-
forts or academic standards. As a consequence, enrolments and the research budget 
will increase if studying becomes c.p. more attractive due to increasing leisure benefits 
or an increasing difference in income between graduates and non-graduates. Similarly, 
enrolments and the research budget will decrease if studying becomes c.p. less attrac-
tive due to increasing opportunity costs caused by an increase in γ or R .  
5. Summary and Prospects for Future Research 
The present paper has developed a formal model describing the behaviour of a univer-
sity within an equilibrium framework where demand for enrolments is traced back to 
the decision of potential students which aim at maximizing expected lifetime income. 
The key factors of this decision process are the students’ preferences and abilities, the 
quality of education offered by the university and several external determinants like, 
e.g., tuition fees and the difference in income between graduates and non-graduates. In 
turn, the behaviour of the university in terms of educational efforts and the strength of 
academic standards depends on the demand for enrolments, on the amount of financial 
resources available from governmental grants or tuition fees and on the specific objec-
tives pursued by the university.  
Within this framework, the paper shows that for given financial resources a university 
that aims at maximizing prestige via research activities always provides only a lower 
quality of education for a smaller number of students compared to a university that 
aims at maximizing enrolments. Moreover, the paper reveals that the effects caused by 
changes in governmental grants or tuition fees, respectively, are quite different depend-
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ing on the objectives pursued by the university. Yet, there is also one common feature: 
Irrespective of which utility function is maximized, partially substituting governmental 
grants by tuition fees would change neither educational efforts nor academic standards, 
but it would inevitably lead to decreasing enrolments. As a positive side-effect, how-
ever, the quality of the remaining population of students in the sense of their average 
ability would increase.  
Of course, the above analysis still suffers from several simplifications. The most im-
portant one might be the absence of competition between different universities. In or-
der to incorporate this issue, one could imagine an extended version of the above 
model with two regions and one university in each of them. In such an extended 
model, potential students in each region would have to decide between three alterna-
tives: working within the non-academic sector, studying at the “home university” or 
studying at the university in the other region. The latter alternative would give rise to 
some kind of “mobility costs” and it has to be expected that the magnitude of these 
costs would be one of the key factors explaining the degree of competition between 
universities.   
A second promising line of future research relates to welfare considerations. The 
model developed so far concentrates on the level of positive economic analysis. 
Hence, it only tries to describe the actual behaviour of universities, but it does not ask 
how universities should behave from the viewpoint of maximizing social welfare. In 
order to account for this shortcoming, one could imagine another extension of the 
above model where the government aims at fixing governmental grants and tuition 
fees in such a way as to maximize a social welfare function comprised of, e.g., the 
number of students which finally become graduated and the quantity of research out-
put produced by the university.  
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Appendix I: Second Order Conditions 
In the case of maximizing s(e,q), the second order condition requires s . Twice 














In the case of maximizing r(e,q), the second order conditions require  and 0ree <′′ −′′′′ qqeerr  
. Let us first consider 0rr qeeq >′′′′ 0ree <′′ . Twice differentiating r  
with respect to e yields r
)q,e(s)epe( −+g()q, =




















Consequently, the second order condition 0ree <′′  is always satisfied. Now, let us turn 
to the second order condition 0qe >rrrr eqqqee ′′′′−′′′′ . Using again  
and accounting for s
)q,e(s)epg()q,e(r −+=
0q =′ , the condition 0rqeeq >rrqqree ′′′′−′′′′  can be re-calculated as: 
[A.4] . 0}s)epg(]s2s)epg[(s){epg( 2qe2eeeqq >′′−+−′−′′−+′′−+
First, assume the special case 0wqe =′′
q,e(w
. Under this assumption, using [4] and account-
ing for the first order condition qwq) ′−=  the second order condition [A.4] can 











}                                                                                0]wqw2[wwq)epg( qqqeq >′′+′′′′−++  
which holds due to , , 0we >′ 0wee <′′ 0w q <′ , and 0wqq <′′ . Hence, for  the sec-
ond order condition  is always satisfied. For the more general case 
with  however, we explicitly have to assume 
0wqe =′′
0rr qeeq >′′′′−rr qqee ′′′′
0wqe ≥′′ >′−+ ′′−′′ ]s2g[(s eqq s)ep ee  
 in order to guarantee 2qe2s)e ′′−pg( + 0qe >rreqrr qqee ′′′′−′′′′ .  
 
Appendix II: Comparative Statics Analysis 
Concerning the comparative statics of changes in governmental grants g it should be 
recognized that changing g has no direct effect on the number of students attracted, but 
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only indirect effects via possible changes of e and q: s )]g(q),g(e[s)g( = . To obtain the 
results summarized in Table 1 for the case of maximizing enrolments, we employ the 
implicit function theorem to the first order condition s 0)]g(e),g(q[q =′ . Due to de*/dg=1 
this leads to dq . Calculating sqqqe s/sdg/* ′′′′−= qe′′  from twice differentiating [4] and 






























for the case of maximizing enrolments. Furthermore, the impact on enrolments can be 
calculated from the total derivative of s . Due to de*/dg=1 and s  we 














For the case of maximizing the research budget, the effects of marginally increasing 
governmental grants can be calculated from differentiating r )]g(q),g(e[s)]g(epg[ ⋅−+=  






Accounting for the first order conditions 0sq =′  and ( )q,e(ss)eg e =′− , [A.9] can be 
reduced to . Hence, the amount of extra money obtained from govern-




Now, consider a marginal increase in the tuition fee p. In contrast to the case consid-
ered above, it has to be recognized that changing p has not only indirect effects on en-
rolments via possible changes of e and q, but also a direct effect since it directly in-
creases the costs of studying: s ]p),p(q),p(e[s)p( = . Let us begin again with a university 
that solely aims at maximizing enrolments. Employing the implicit function theorem to 
the first order condition 0]p),p(e),p(q[sq =′
qw′
 and accounting for de*/dp=1 yields 
. Next, twice differentiating [4] with respect to q and p and 
accounting for  reveals 
qqqpqe s/)ss(dp/*dq ′′′′+′′−=
q)q,e(w −= 0sqp =′′ . Hence, we obtain dq qqqe s/sdp/* ′′′′−= . 
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Comparing this with [A.7] shows that marginally increasing p has the same (positive) 
impact on q* as marginally increasing g. Moreover, due to dq  we ob-
tain dq*=de*=0 for the case of marginally substituting governmental grants by tuition 





























The impact of marginally increasing p on the number of students attracted in the case 
of maximizing enrolments can be calculated from differentiating  with 
respect to p. Due to de/dp=1 and s
]p
0q =′  this leads to dp/*ds . Here,  indi-
cates the indirect effect via increasing educational efforts and 
e′
 refers to the direct 









In the case of maximizing the research budget, the effects of marginally increasing the 
tuition fee can be calculated from differentiating r epg[ −+=  with re-
spect to p: 
[A.11] ]sqses)[epg()edr ppqpep ′+′′+′′−++′−  
Accounting for s  and )q,e(ss)epg( e =′−+ , [A.11] can be reduced to: 
[A.12] ps)epg(
dr ′−+ . 
Since  indicates only the direct effect on enrolments caused by increasing the 
tuition fee, this result implies, that educational efforts as well as educational demands 
will remain unchanged (de*/dp=dq*/dp=0). As a consequence, we obtain for the num-
ber of students attracted: ds*/dp=s
sp′









Finally, due to de*/dp=de*/dg=0 and dq*/dp=dq*/dg=0 we again obtain the result that 
marginally substituting governmental grants by tuition fees (  has no im-
pact on educational quality but leads to decreasing enrolments. 
To obtain the comparative statics results concerning marginal variations of z, β, γ and 
R  in the case of maximizing enrolments, apply the implicit function theorem to the 
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first order condition s 0]),(e),(q[q =ωωω′  with ω to be substituted by z, β, γ or R , re-
spectively. Accounting for de*/dω=0, this leads to dq qqq s/sd/* ′′′′−=ω ω
q
. Next, twice 
differentiating [4] and accounting for wq)q,e(w ′−=  reveals that the second partial 
derivatives  evaluated at the optimum are given by ω′′qs .0sq =′′ ω  Consequently, we ob-
tain  for 0=ωd/*dq ].R,,z[ βγ∈ω  Moreover, because e* and q* remain unchanged, the 
impact caused on enrolments, can easily be calculated from the first derivatives of [4]. 
This leads to ds*/dz>0, ds*/dβ>0, ds*/dγ<0 and ds*/d R <0 as summarized in Table 1. 
](epg[r −+=
)Rz[∈





In the case of maximizing the research budget, the effects of marginally increasing z, 
β, γ or R  can be calculated from differentiating ),(q),(e[s)] ωωω⋅ω  with 






Accounting for the first order conditions s  and ( )q,e(se =′ , [A.14] can 





Since  indicates only the direct effect on enrolments caused by increasing ω, this 
result again implies that educational efforts as well as educational demands will remain 
constant: de*/dω=dq*/dω=0. As a consequence, the impact caused on enrolments and 
the research budget again can be calculated from the first derivatives of [4] with re-
spect to z, β, γ and 
ω′s
R , respectively. This leads to the results shown in the last column 
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